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BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION BY AMICUS CURIAE 
Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure permits the filing of an amicus 
brief by leave of the court in response to a motion by an applicant-amicus curiae. A 
motion by the Utah State Property Rights Ombudsman (the ombudsman) was filed by 
mailing it to the court concurrently with the mailing of this amicus brief by first class mail 
on December 20, 2004. This brief has accordingly been filed within the extended time 
allowed for the filing of the brief of the Cross-Petitioner, whose position this amicus brief 
supports. 
The opinions, conclusions, and arguments stated in this brief are those of the 
Amicus alone and are not official positions of the State of Utah or of the Attorney 
General or the Department of Natural Resources of the State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
By order of the Court dated August 5, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court granted 
review by certiorari in this matter limited to the following issues: 
(1) Whether the Nollan/Dolan (Nollan v. California Coastal Comm % 483 U.S. 
825, 841-842 (1987) and Dolan v. City ofTigard, 274, 377 (sic) (1994) "rough 
proportionality" test applies where an alleged taking results from a uniform legislative 
land-use scheme rather than an ad hoc site-specific adjudicative decision; 
(2) whether the court of appeals erred in holding the district court's review was 
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limited to the administrative record; and 
(3) whether Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits review regardless of the 
state of the administrative record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Amicus appears in this matter primarily to argue that the remedy imposed by 
the Court of Appeals was inappropriate and that the precedent set in the opinion rendered 
will work great hardship on average citizens who attempt to challenge the imposition of 
unfair and extreme exactions and conditions on development. In order to reach this issue, 
however, the Amicus must first address the first issue in this matter and support his 
conclusion that the imposition of exactions in this matter is not a legislative decision, but 
an administrative decision. 
Issue (1): There are few issues that are as clear in takings jurisprudence as the 
heightened degree of scrutiny afforded when governmental action results in physical 
occupancy of private property and/or the interference with the protected property right to 
prohibit the physical entry upon private property by others. 
The specific land dedication requirement discussed in the Dolan case, and which 
the U.S. Supreme Court declared to be an illegal exaction, was itself a legislative mandate 
imposed administratively on Ms. Dolan in the process of her application for a land use 
approval. 
Precedents cited by the Petitioner (hereinafter referred to as "the County") in its 
opening brief are inapposite here. They are cases involving the imposition of a general 
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scheme of fees or regulations on development that are similar to general applications of 
local government police power. None of those cases involve the forced physical 
occupation of private property as a condition of development. None involved a matter of 
heightened scrutiny of favored property rights. The clear holding in Dolan is that such 
matters are always administrative and always subject to a duty that the governmental 
entity imposing exactions must do so with an "individualized determination" that the 
balance of burdens on both sides of the analysis is "roughly proportional". 
Issue (2): This case is about an administrative decision to impose exactions on a 
development approval - a land use decision. This Court has previously held in 
unequivocal language that administrative land use decisions are reviewed as record 
appeals and that local land use decisions will be overturned if not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record. There is no need to remand this matter again to create a record, 
since the planning staff, the planning commission and the county commission conducted a 
total of four processes, deliberated four times and made four separate decisions to impose 
the exactions in the normal land use process where there was ample opportunity for the 
County to meet its burden to establish the record that the Nollan/Dolan/Banberry1 
precedents require: an individualized determination that the exactions imposed meet the 
Nollan/Dolan/Banberry standards of essential nexus, rough proportionality, and fairness. 
1
 While the Court of Appeals cited Nollan and Dolan as the basis for its discussion of 
exactions, this Court has also held that development exactions must be fair and equitable, and 
that the government entity involved has a burden to do the calculations, notably in the case of 
Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 904-05 (Utah, 1981). 
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If the governmental entity fails to do so, and thus if the record does not contain 
substantial evidence to support those required findings, then just as this Court and the 
Court of Appeals have held on a number of previous occasions in dealing with other 
administrative law and land use issues, the action of the governmental entity is to simply 
be overturned. The property owner has no duty to go back and attempt again to persuade 
the government entity to establish a record, just as he or she would not be required to 
attempt again to establish a record in challenging any of the other non-legislative land use 
decisions that this Court has reviewed on the record. 
Issue (3): The Amicus makes no argument related to the third issue before this 
Court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The County inaccurately states the standard of review by characterizing the claim 
of the Cross Petitioner (hereinafter referred to as "BAM") as a facial challenge to a 
legislative act. It is not. BAM has challenged the ad hoc application of a legislative 
scheme to a specific land use approval. This review is on the record as it is with any 
administrative land use decision. The proper standard of review is therefore that the 
County's actions in requiring the dedication and improvement of real property in order to 
obtain an administrative land use approval must be declared to be illegal if those actions 
are not supported by "substantial evidence on the record" as that record is established 
during the normal local land use decision process. (See discussion below). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter involves a claim that BAM, as a property owner, was the subject of 
inverse condemnation by the County. BAM claimed that various exactions were 
imposed on it as a condition of the County's approval of a subdivision plat, and that the 
exactions were unconstitutionally imposed without the payment of just compensation. 
The panel of judges that heard the matter in the Court of Appeals unanimously 
agreed about the characterization of the law related to exactions and conditions on 
development and the proper standards of review of both legislative and administrative 
decisions by local government officials with regard to such exactions. 
In Dolan, the Court concluded that for a development exaction to be constitutional, 
the government must show an '"essential nexus1... between the 'legitimate state 
interest1" and the land dedication requirement The Court further explained that 
to succeed the government "must make some sort of individualized determination 
that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development." The Court labeled this examination a "rough 
proportionality" test. 
BAM Opinion at f 15. The Court of Appeals then determined that since no such 
determination was provided in a record produced by some appeals process, it would order 
that the matter be remanded back to the District Court, which would determine what 
entity at the County would conduct an appeal. At that appeal, the county officials who 
hear the appeal should decide if there has been or can be an individualized determination 
made that the exactions imposed on BAM are related both in nature and extent to the 
impact of BAM's development. 
From that decision the County has requested certiorari from this Court, claiming 
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that this was not an administrative matter at all, but a legislative issue. The County claims 
that ordinance-based development exactions are not subject to Dolan-style scrutiny. 
BAM also requested that this Court hear the matter, claiming that the Court of Appeals 
should not have remanded the matter back to the district court, but should have entered a 
decision on the merits of the case such as was suggested by Judge Orme's dissenting 
opinion. 
The Amicus supports the opinion of Cross-Petitioner BAM in this matter for the 
reasons stated below. 
ARGUMENT 1 
The Imposition of Development Exactions are, 
of Necessity. Administrative Matters. 
This citation from the BAM opinion above duplicates the text of the Dolan 
decision, where the U.S. Supreme Court wrote: 
No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort 
of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in 
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. 
Dolan at 391 (emphasis added). This specific statement in and of itself defeats any 
claim that exactions can be imposed by legislative fiat. An "individualized 
determination" of "the" required dedication cannot be made in an ordinance. In its 
opening brief, the County claims that issues related to development exactions under its 
legislative roads plan should be treated with the deferential review that this Court and 
others have afforded legislative exercise of the police power. The Dolan Court discussed 
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this issue as well and dismissed such arguments: 
JUSTICE STEVENS1 dissent relies upon a law review article for the proposition that 
the city's conditional demands for part of petitioner's property are "a species of 
business regulation that heretofore warranted a strong presumption of 
constitutional validity."... But simply denominating a governmental measure as a 
"business regulation" does not immunize it from constitutional challenge on the 
grounds that it violates a provision of the Bill of Rights. In Marshall v. Barlow's, 
Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978), we held that a statute authorizing a warrantless search 
of business premises in order to detect OSHA violations violated the Fourth 
Amendment. (Citations omitted) And in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980), we held that an order of the 
New York Public Service Commission, designed to cut down the use of electricity 
because of a fuel shortage, violated the First Amendment insofar as it prohibited 
advertising by a utility company to promote the use of electricity. We see no 
reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much apart of the Bill 
of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to 
the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances. 
Dolan at 392 (Emphasis added). Thus the Dolan opinion clearly states that 
constitutional rights, whether property rights or other rights enumerated in the 
Constitution, cannot be swept aside by legislative schemes such as those listed in this 
excerpt from Dolan. The Court then specifically rejects a minimal level of scrutiny such 
the "reasonably debatable" standard that the County wishes this Court to adopt by 
painting the issue here as purely a legislative matter. Dolan instead imposes a 
heightened standard of review: 
We think the "reasonable relationship" test adopted by a majority of the state 
courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previously 
discussed. But we do not adopt it as such, partly because the term "reasonable 
relationship" seems confusingly similar to the term "rational basis" which 
describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. We think a term such as "rough proportionality" best 
encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 
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Dolan at 391. Legislatively adopted ordinances, standards and rules can certainly 
set the stage for the imposition of exactions. But they must contain language providing 
for an administrative process that results in an individualized determination that the 
exactions are imposed in a manner that is roughly proportionate. 
It is important to note that the specific land dedication requirement discussed in the 
Dolan case, and which the U.S. Supreme Court declared to be an illegal exaction, was 
itself a legislative mandate imposed administratively on Ms. Dolan in the process of her 
application for a land use approval. 
After the completion of a transportation study that identified congestion in the 
Central Business District as a particular problem, the city adopted a plan for a 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway intended to encourage alternatives to automobile 
transportation for short trips. The CDC requires that new development facilitate 
this plan by dedicating land for pedestrian pathways where provided for in the 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway plan. 
Dolan at 375. In Dolan the point was made that an exaction, even when 
legislatively imposed, is not going to be reviewed under a deferential standard as was the 
general zoning scheme described in Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 374 (1926). 
Although the Dolan exactions arose from a city-wide pedestrian/bicycle pathway plan, the 
Court did not include the Dolan issue in the same genre as Euclid even though both of 
these matters arose from land use regulations and both originated in legislative 
enactments. The Dolan Court also noted in footnote 8 of its opinion that the City of 
Tigard had "made an adjudicative decision to condition (Ms. Dolan's) application for a 
building permit." Since the context of the Dolan case and the BAM case are almost 
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identical, we can assume that the imposition of exactions on BAM, even if they are 
legislatively mandated, was accomplished in an administrative or adjudicative process. 
Precedents cited by the County in its opening brief which hold that the imposition 
by legislation of fees and police power regulations on development is not subject to the 
Nollan/Dolan analysis are inapposite here. They are cases involving the imposition of a 
general scheme of fees or regulations on development that are similar to general 
applications of local government police power. None of those cases involve the forced 
physical occupation of private property as a condition of development. None involved a 
matter of heightened scrutiny of favored property rights.-
ARGUMENT 2 
An Additional Record is Not Required in this Matter 
The disagreement among the panel hearing this matter at the Court of Appeals, 
however, was not about the legislative/administrative deference issue. The entire panel 
held that even a legislative scheme required the individualized Dolan analysis. The 
dissent of Judge Orme was written in response to the decision of the majority to remand 
the matter for further hearings and the establishment of a record for review. 
The decision by the BAM majority to remand this matter has eroded the ability of 
citizens, land use administrators, and property owners in Utah to determine the 
2See BAM opinion, at ff 56-57 (Orme, dissenting) for specific citation to several 
prominent precedents that are on point and reflect this national consensus that "[A] municipality 
should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by utilizing a different 
bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property." 
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appropriate method to establish a record of local land use decisions. If the Court of 
Appeals' decision to remand this matter for further administrative hearings is overturned 
and thus reconciled with prior legal precedent, there will be less confusion about how the 
record of a land use decision is to be created, by whom, and when. 
The Court of Appeals recognized this case as an administrative matter and 
determined that the County had acted in violation of Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001 by 
making a decision unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. That is indeed 
correct, but the Court of Appeals majority named the wrong land use decision as being 
arbitrary, capricious and illegal. In para. 5 of the opinion, the Court of Appeals held that 
the decision to deny an appeal of the takings question was arbitrary, capricious and 
illegal. It should have held, instead, that the decision to impose the exactions originally 
was arbitrary, capricious and illegal. 
Significantly, the County in its opening brief to this Court has ceded this issue and 
agreed that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the district court's review of 
administrative land use decisions is based on the administrative record. (P. 35 of 43) and 
that the imposition of exactions on land use approvals is administrative in nature. 
The confusion with the Court of Appeals decision comes, ironically, because the 
property owner sought too many reviews at the local level - not that it sought too few. 
The decision that the Court of Appeals held to be unsupported by substantial evidence on 
the record was not an essential appeal. It was simply sought by the property owner as an 
additional opportunity to resolve the matter locally before proceeding to court. The 
-10-
opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter has punished the property owner for 
seeking a remedy it was not required to seek under the law.3 This matter was ripe and the 
record was closed when the County planning commission and county commission each 
decided twice to impose the exactions without meeting the Nollan/Dolan/Banberry tests. 
Under the clear holding of Dolan, as explained above, this duty to cite substantial 
evidence to support its decision was the County's duty, not the property owner's. 
(A) There is Clear Legal Precedent Related to the Record 
Required in Administrative Land Use Decisions 
This Court recently restated and clarified the difference between local legislative 
decisions and local administrative decisions. In the recent case ofBradley v. Pay son City 
2003 UT 16, this Court noted that different standards of review apply for each type of 
decision. 
When a municipality makes a land use decision as a function of its legislative 
powers, we have held that such a decision is not arbitrary and capricious so long as 
the grounds for the decision are "reasonably debatable."... When a land use 
decision is made as an exercise of administrative or quasi-judicial powers, 
however, we have held that such decisions are not arbitrary and capricious if they 
are supported by "substantial evidence." 
Bradley at [^10. This case falls under the administrative prong of this two-fold 
3For example, the legislature even created a takings appeals procedure in Utah Code Ann. 
§63-90a-4 and specifically declared it to be optional and unnecessary to bring a takings claim in 
court. While this is not the context that BAM chose to use in asking for an appeal of the 
exactions imposed, it does indicate that the clear intent of the legislature that such an appeal was 
not necessary in order to establish the record needed to appeal an administrative land use 
decision to the district court. 
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process. This Court and the Court of Appeals have consistently held that where the 
record lacks the substantial evidence needed to support an administrative land use 
decision, that decision is overturned. Where there is sufficient evidence, the decision is 
upheld. See e.g., Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (1988) (Public clamor 
held to be insufficient evidence to support denial of conditional use permit, permit is 
ordered to be granted); Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 
1034-35 (Utah 1984) (board of adjustment's denial of a zoning variance upheld because 
property owner failed to meet his burden to justify the variance); Wells v. Bd. of 
Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp., 936 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (board of 
adjustment decision granting variance overturned because specific findings not made on 
the record); Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (decision by board of adjustment to grant special exception is upheld because 
evidence supporting it was placed on the record); Wadsworth Construction v. West 
Jordan City, 2000 UT App 49 (City Council decision denying conditional use overturned 
because record showed the decision was based on generalized complaints of neighbors 
and not substantial evidence, court ordered that conditional use permit be granted.) 
It is to be noted that in all these recent land use cases, the Utah appellate courts 
have made consistent decisions about appeals related to local administrative land use 
decisions. Where the decision by the municipality or county was supported by substantial 
evidence on the record, it was sustained. Where the record was not sufficient to support 
an action, the action was overturned. The person or entity whose responsibility it was to 
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establish the record bore the consequences of not fulfilling that function. In all of these 
cases, the relevant land use decision was overturned rather than remanded back for 
another hearing to establish a record. 
(B) The BAM Opinion by the Court of Appeals Confuses 
Clear Precedent About Land Use Appeals on the Record 
In BAM the Court of Appeals correctly held that the process of proving that an 
exaction meets the Nollan/Dolan/Banberry test was an administrative, fact-laden process. 
As such, a record review is required. The Court of Appeals then held that no record 
existed, so one must be created by another appeals process at the County. 
In coming to this conclusion the Court of Appeals inaccurately assumed that there 
had been no hearing on the exactions issue. There clearly had been. In the process of 
subdivision approval, the county engineering staff, the county planning commission and 
the county commission had conducted^owr separate processes of review where, under 
Dolan, they had a duty to make an individualized analysis of the basis for the exactions 
they imposed on BAM's application for subdivision approval, yet apparently failed to do 
so. 
According to the County's opening brief before this Court, the decisions made by 
the engineering staff, the Planning Commission or the County Commission involving the 
proposed subdivision were as follows: 
August 26, 1997, engineering staff approval with exactions; 
June 23, 1998, Planning Commission imposes exactions at preliminary approval; 
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July 18, 1998, County Commission refuses to hold a hearing on BAM's claim that 
exactions are illegal; 
June 23, 1999, Planning Commission again imposes exactions in final approval; 
and August 18, 1999, County Commission imposes exactions in final approval 
process. 
Note that two of these hearings were held after the July 18, 1998 refusal by the 
County Commission to hear an appeal where BAM claimed the development exactions 
were illegal and unconstitutional because those exactions were unsupported by findings 
of rough proportionality. The County had four chances to lay upon the record the 
individualized determination required that their exactions were roughly proportionate, 
two of those chances after BAM had even filed a notice of claim specifically challenging 
the exactions as unconstitutional. The County did not meet that duty on four separate 
occasions, but the Court of Appeals ordered that the County should go back and try again. 
The Court of Appeals' majority opinion misses the essence of Dolan: That the 
County, not the property owner, had the burden to establish the record and to make the 
individualized determination, which it failed to do. In a number of previous opinions, 
cited above, both this Court and the Court of Appeals have consistently held that, where 
the local land use authority had a duty to include substantial evidence in the record and 
failed to do so, the action of the authority was invalid. 
Is this too much of a burden on local government? This matter involves an 
identified civil right, protected by the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of Utah which 
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has been specifically given the privilege of heightened scrutiny by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, just as many other constitutional rights have been protected. As Chief Justice 
Rhenquist stated in Dolan: "We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth 
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation." {Dolan, at 392) As 
Justice William Brennen observed in a noted takings case, "After all, a policeman must 
know the Constitution, then why not a planner?" San Diego Gas and Electric v. City of 
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 (1981) (Brennen, J., dissenting). 
The BAM decision from the Court of Appeals apparently holds that in the narrow 
arena of land use law that involve inverse condemnation challenges to development 
exactions, where government entities have a heightened duty to make findings and 
support such decisions, a failure to do so is not fatal to the local government's efforts to 
defend its actions. Even after the property owner goes to court, his or her only remedy 
under BAM is to ask that the court force the recalcitrant government entity to hold a 
hearing and enter findings of rough proportionality. 
Could it not seem ironic that in this one area where the U.S. Supreme Court has 
established guidelines that are actually clearer than any other area of regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, based on a heightened scrutiny and a pronounced effort by the high Court 
to protect significant property rights, the Court of Appeals has made the process more 
complicated, tedious and exhausting than any other claim brought under land use law? In 
the other land use cases before this Court and the Court of Appeals, the local decision was 
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reviewed on the record that came with the decision, not on the lack of a record related to 
an extraneous appeal. 
( C) The Confusion Over the Record Should Be Cured 
This Court should take advantage of this opportunity to clarify what is meant by 
the duty to justify development exactions with substantial evidence on the record and 
reaffirm the relatively clear precedent set before BAM by the Utah appellate courts in land 
use matters. If BAM is allowed to stand as decided, then a very unworkable and unfair 
legal precedent will have been created. 
This state of affairs is of particular concern to the amicus property rights 
ombudsman. The office of the property rights ombudsman was created in 1997 by the 
Utah Legislature in an effort to assist property owners to understand the way that property 
is regulated and to assist local government and property owners in resolving disputes. 
The goal of the office is to attempt to avoid litigation and to use conciliation, mediation, 
and other alternative dispute resolution processes to solve problems in a manner that is 
fast, fair, and more friendly than the other options. The 2004 legislature expanded the 
definition of his duties to include all land use issues.4 
The ombudsman receives a number of calls each year about illegal conditions on 
4The Property Rights Ombudsman statute is at Utah Code Ann. §63-34-13, last amended 
by Senate Bill 9 in the 2004 General Session of the Legislature. The amendment included 
changes defining the ombudsman's role as assisting with all land use disputes. See §63-34-
13(4). In the Land Use Development Management Act for both municipalities and counties, the 
ombudsman is given the power to arrange arbitration of land use disputes involving 
constitutional takings issues and stay the time to file a land use appeal. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
10-9-1001 and 17-27-1001. 
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development. As one might expect, the context for such a call involves some concerns 
about cost and timing. The Ombudsman's office received complaints from 49 families 
and companies about illegal exactions in FY 2003. This represented approximately 25% 
of the land use questions brought to him. 
These cases involve real families with real problems. For example, it is common 
that a family wants to divide land into two parcels to build a second home on what was 
originally one oversized parcel so that two or more generations can live closer. Because 
this is a subdivision of land, such a request sometimes triggers all the processes and 
responses that the subdivision ordinance usually imposes on larger scale development by 
full-time real estate professionals. Sometimes this results in the imposition of 
extraordinary burdens, particularly in situations where, as the County has described in the 
instant case, local officials feel they have no discretion to depart from rigid, legislatively 
imposed rules. Recent cases have involved: 
• excessive street dedications of more than twice the width of a typical single 
family residential street without any showing that one house would create 
the need for an arterial highway; 
• paying to bury large regional power lines without any showing that adding 
one more household created the need to do so; 
• building bike paths for public use and thus interfering with the protected 
right to exclude others from private land; 
• digging up and replacing canal systems in the existing public right of way 
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where those canals are not even publicly owned and do not provide 
irrigation water to the land to be subdivided; 
• demanding "slope easements" to allow embankments to be built on private 
property in the future to support arterial streets much wider than a single 
family residential use justifies; 
• dedication of creekside and hillside lands for public open space and trails in 
greatly disproportionate quantities when compared with the open space 
demanded of typical suburban development; and 
• demanding that the applicant for a second home on a rural farm agree to 
participate in significant costs of future street systems to serve adjoining 
lands when those neighboring lands develop into full-blown suburban 
sprawl. These future streets are completely unrelated to the need to access 
the individual second home that is the subject of the approval sought. 
All of these exactions are real world examples where local governments in Utah 
attempted to impose exactions in response to a single property owner's request to divide 
off a parcel of land so another family member could build a home on what was originally 
an oversized lot or agricultural acreage. None required a zone change. None added any 
more density than one additional residence near an existing older family home. 
If, under BAM, the local government entity involved in one of these cases refused 
to provide substantial evidence on the record to support these exactions, or to otherwise 
agree to rescind the exactions, the property owner involved would have to go to the 
-18-
district court and get an order directing the local decision makers to create a record of 
their refusal. This is not correct or fair and it eliminates the statutory ability of the 
property owner to avoid litigation if he or she would prefer to mediate disputes through 
the ombudsman. 
The imposition of exactions in the land use process, by the precedent established 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, and the Utah Court of Appeals, is 
subject to a burden imposed by Nollan, Dolan, and Banberry that findings of nexus, 
rough proportionality, and fairness be met by the government entity imposing the 
exactions. When that duty is not met, the imposition of the exactions should be of 
necessity invalid, just as a variance would be invalid if unsupported by substantial 
evidence and the denial of a conditional use permit is invalid if substantial evidence is not 
provided that supports that denial. 
ARGUMENT 3 
The Result of BAM is Excessive Cost Delay 
and Hassle for Citizens 
BAM involves a landowner with a significant commercial interest in development. 
It is no doubt daunting for small municipalities to attempt to cope with all of the pressures 
and difficulties involved in managing local land use for the benefit of all of the citizens 
and to cope with the sometimes vast resources of large developers or multinational 
corporations. However, those involved professionally in the real estate industry have 
learned to understand the necessary give and take that must be undertaken if one is to 
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succeed in a competitive, market-driven business. The Amicus filing this brief is not 
doing so to join forces with big developers and gang up on small municipalities. 
The office of the property rights ombudsman was created to serve another group 
entirely. They are home owners, small farmers, neighbors of proposed development, 
independent business people and passive investors. The laws must, of course, apply 
equally to them, even when those laws approach the unfathomable. 
These people are particularly vulnerable to local land use decisions that are 
arbitrary, capricious, and illegal. This is not to say that local land use professionals 
consistently abuse discretion, violate due process, engage in extra-curricular enforcement 
of the law while ignoring the ordinances. The ombudsman's experience is just the 
opposite. Most of the time he explains to those who call that local officials are just doing 
their jobs within the discretion that the courts and legislature have given them. If this 
were not so, a one-person ombudsman office could hardly cope with the avalanche of 
land use complaints that would flow to it. 
But when hundreds of local government entities delegate to thousands of decision 
makers the hundreds of thousands of transactions that are processed annually, there are 
always a number of occasions where, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated it, 
regulation goes "too far." {Penn. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 363 (1922). When that occurs, 
there ought to be a fast, fair, friendly way to resolve the concerns and to move on with 
relationships intact. 
The BAM decision works against the opportunity for the ombudsman to assist 
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property owners in resolving a common variety of land use disputes. Where we find 
those few local officials with the inclination to impose undue burdens as exactions and to 
inappropriately abuse discretion, BAM imposes on citizens who attempt to defend 
protected Constitutional rights another layer of obstacles and appeals that did not exist 
before. Obstacles that are simply beyond the ability of an individual homeowner or small 
businessperson to cope with. For those who cannot afford to seek a court order requiring 
the local government to enter findings, the fight to protect rights that were supposedly 
given special status by Dolan is over before it even begins. 
It would be easy to see how it happens that often the property owner simply caves 
in because the cost of fighting the exaction is more than the value of the land or 
improvements demanded. 
CONCLUSION 
The BAM Court correctly held that the review of exactions imposed, even when 
authorized by a legislative scheme, is an administrative process and that judicial review of 
that process must be made on the record. Government entities under Dolan have an 
affirmative duty to make an individualized determination that exactions imposed are 
roughly proportionate. Exactions must therefore be supported by substantial evidence if 
they are to be upheld. 
The result of the BAM Court's remand, however, is that citizens have few viable 
options to challenge a practice that is too common in local land use administration. After 
BAM there is no effective appeals procedure available when the local government 
-21-
decides to stonewall the complaints of property owners. The ombudsman's opportunity 
to assist small property owners has been greatly reduced by the Court of Appeals' holding 
in this matter. 
By restating the principles outlined above that this Court has long embraced, it 
could restore a degree of certainty and finality that would otherwise be lost to citizens 
attempting to use property in a manner that is legal, appropriate, and unencumbered by 
excessive regulation and exactions. As it has held repeatedly, this Court should restate 
the simple rule for administrative appeals: If the local government entity has not 
supported its exactions with substantial evidence on the record, the decision to impose 
those exactions will be deemed invalid and there will be no duty by the property owner to 
comply with them. There is no need for a remand to the District Court so that it can order 
the County to conduct another hearing in this matter and establish a record for review. 
Dated this Twentieth day of December, 2004 
C R A I G M L ^ 
Property Rights Ombudsman 
Utah Department of Natural Resources 
Amicus Curiae 
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